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Friday, 5 October 2018
HAS FRANCIS SPLIT THE CHURCH?
HAS FRANCIS SPLIT THE CHURCH?
Editor’s note: The opinions in this article are the authors' AND DO NOT REPRESENT GENE'S VIEWS .
Under a hard rain and a sea of colorful umbrellas in St. Peter’s Square on March 13, 2013, the Catholic church changed its guard with the election of the Archbishop of Buenos Aires Jorge Mario Bergoglio, the first pope ever to take the name Francis.
The 77-year-old was elected as the 266th man to lead the Roman Catholic Church through secret burned ballots in an archaic, ritualistic conclave, but it was clear from the start that his election was nothing short of revolutionary.
He was elected after the shocking resignation of Pope Benedict XVI, the first such living-pope transition in more than 400 years. Francis is the first pope from Latin America, the first Jesuit and the first non-European to hold the position since the 8th century.
His personal choices sent strong messages. By refusing the usual gold cross popes are expected to wear and opting for simple silver instead, he made it clear that the days of high living and big spending by the church elite were over.
Still, everything that led to his election in 2013, from Benedict’s shocking resignation to his hands-on and often controversial approach, has changed the church in ways yet too soon to measure.
Pope Francis’ teaching has ‘split’ the Church: Philosopher
October 4, 2017 (LifeSiteNews) – Pope Francis’ 2016 exhortation on marriage and family has already “split” the Catholic Church, causing division among bishops and marginalizing priests, a prominent German Catholic philosopher said.
“The split within the Church concerning Amoris Laetitia (AL) has already taken place,” said Professor Robert Spaemann in an interview with OnePeterFive’s Maike Hickson. “Different bishops’ conferences have published contradictory guidelines. And the poor priests are left alone,” he added.
Spaemann, a former member of the Pontifical Academy for Life and long-time friend of Pope Emeritus Benedict, discussed during the interview Dr. Joseph Seifert’s removal from a Spanish university for having criticized the pope’s teaching in AL. He also discussed some of the other chilling effects the pope’s exhortation has had throughout the Catholic Church globally.
The philosopher related how an African priest recently visited him and tearfully shared the prospect the priest faces of suspension should he refuse Holy Communion to divorced and remarried Catholics living in habitual adultery.
“The Commandment ‘Thou shalt obey God more than man’ also applies to the teaching of the Church,” said Spaemann.
“If the priest is convinced that he may not give Holy Communion to the ‘divorced and remarried’ then he has to follow the word of Jesus and the 2,000-year-old teaching of the Church. If he is being suspended for it, he has become a ‘witness to the Truth,’” he added.
Spaemann said the Church’s doctrine prohibiting adultery is likely the most ignored today.
He urged Catholics, whether laity or priests facing the demand to give Communion to divorced and civilly remarried Catholics, to remain faithful to the unchanging teaching and practice of the Church.
“Those priests, who would be now forced by their superiors to give Holy Communion to public and unrepentant adulterers, or to other notorious and public sinners, should answer them with a holy conviction,” said Spaemann, namely that ‘Our behavior is the behavior of the entire Catholic world throughout two thousand years.’”
When Spaemann, who grew up under National Socialism, was asked how he would advise Catholics in the current difficult state of the Church, he replied: “It was easier during Nazi times to be a faithful Christian than today.”
When Spaemann was asked if, as a philosopher, he agreed with the argument that new social changes must also bring forth a change of the moral laws, he answered in the negative. He adding that even should applications of the law change, “the principles of the moral law are always and everywhere the same.”
“If there exists a dominant view and that dominant view contradicts the moral law, the essence of man,” Spaemann said, “then the whole society is in a sorry state.”
'Unity...based upon the truth'
Spaemann related during the interview how he was shocked at Dr. Seifert’s removal from his teaching post. Archbishop Javier Martínez Fernández, bishop of Granada, Spain, removed Seifert — a close friend of the late Pope St. John Paul II — from his position at the International Academy of Philosophy in Granada in August after Seifert had published a critique of Pope Francis’ exhortation.
Spaemann criticized Archbishop Martinez’s claim that Seifert was confusing the faithful and undermining the Church’s unity.
“The unity of the Church is based upon the truth,” he said.
“What Seifert criticizes is the breach with the continuous teaching of the Church and with the explicit teachings of Popes Paul VI and John Paul II,” Spaemann said. “Saint John Paul once, in Veritatis Splendor, stressed, explicitly, that there is no exception to the rejection of the 'remarried' divorcees with regard to the Sacraments. Pope Francis contradicts the teaching of Veritatis Splendor just as explicitly.”
The philosopher said that the removal of Seifert has sent shockwaves to all Catholic centers of higher education.
“Every philosopher who works in an ecclesial institution now has to ask himself whether he can still continue his service there,” he said.
Not long after the April 2016 release of AL, Spaemann had said that changing the Church’s sacramental practice would be “a breach with its essential anthropological and theological teaching on human marriage and sexuality.”
“It is clear to every thinking person who knows the texts that are important in this context that [with Amoris Laetitia] there is a breach” with the Church’s Tradition, he said at that time.
Last December Spaemann said the four cardinals who had submitted the five yes-or-no questions (dubia) to Pope Francis for clarification on AL had chosen the right path. He said it was deplorable that only four cardinals had done so.
Spaemann said that the Church’s magisterium was “debased” by Pope Francis’ refusal to answer the four cardinals.
Will Pope Francis Cause a Schism in the Catholic Church?
In his new book, “To Change the Church,” the Times columnist Ross Douthat critiques the Pontiff.
For
the better part of the past two years, Catholics around the world have
been fighting over a footnote. In April, 2016, Pope Francis, after
leading two synods devoted to “the vocation and mission of the family in
the Church and in the contemporary world,” published a teaching
document titled “Amoris Laetitia,” or “The Joy of Love.” Tucked away in
the eighth chapter of the text is footnote 351, which corresponds to an
anodyne-sounding sentence about the extent to which “mitigating factors”
might affect a pastor’s handling of certain personal predicaments—such
as divorce, followed by remarriage—that are considered sinful. Catholics
who find themselves in such situations, the footnote explains, might be
helped along by the very sacraments that their transgressions would
typically bar them from receiving. Communion “is not a prize for the
perfect,” Francis writes, “but a powerful medicine and nourishment for
the weak.”
For Pope Francis’s progressive supporters, this was the
latest sign of a pastoral tendency toward inclusiveness and mercy. For
his more traditionalist critics, it was a direct threat to the Catholic
injunction against divorce, about which Jesus was brutally clear, in the
Book of Matthew: “Whoever divorces his wife (unless the marriage is
unlawful), and marries another, commits adultery.” Catholic doctrine
holds that marriage is an “indissoluble” ontological state, and that,
for this reason, Communion is not extended to those who violate it. A
few weeks after the release of “Amoris Laetitia,” the German Catholic
philosopher Robert Spaemann said in an interview that footnote 351 could
lead to “a schism that would not be settled on the peripheries, but
rather in the heart of the Church.” He added, “May God forbid that from
happening.”
Spaemann, a professor emeritus at the University of
Munich, has close ties to Francis’s predecessor, Pope Benedict XVI.
Benedict, born Joseph Ratzinger, was himself a German academic, and is
the author of notable works of scholarship, including the 1968 book
“Introduction to Christianity,” a much heralded explication of the
faith. In 1977, Ratzinger became the archbishop of Munich and Freising,
and then, in 1981, prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, which, once upon a time, was called the Inquisition. As prefect,
he served Pope John Paul II as a kind of theologian-in-chief, and was
known, on occasion, to gently correct even the Pontiff. Ratzinger was
elected Pope, in 2005, after the death of John Paul, but continued to
devote himself to scholarship; in addition to the sermons and
encyclicals that are the ordinary literary duty of that office, he found
time to compose and publish “Jesus of Nazareth,” a three-volume work on
the life of Christ. He was not a popularizer of the faith, as John Paul
was, or as Francis would become; he was a writer. And he became, over
time, a living metaphor for the way in which an emphasis on a religion’s
textual dimensions can act both as an agent of clarity and as a bulwark
against change.
Then, in 2013, Benedict committed one of the more
radical acts in recent Catholic history: he resigned. The last
voluntary papal resignation had occurred in 1294, soon after the hermit
Pietro Angelerio was made Pope Celestine V, as a sort of cosmic joke.
Angelerio had written angrily to an assembly of cardinals, in the midst
of a two-year impasse in naming a new Pope, warning them that they would
incur God’s wrath if it lasted any longer. The cardinals’ response was
to drag the monk out of seclusion and fit him for white robes. He stayed
in office just long enough to declare the Pope’s right to abdicate and
to avail himself of that option. Dante is said to have written Celestine
into the Inferno; according to this theory, he’s the anonymous figure
in Hell’s antechamber “who due to cowardice made the great refusal.” No
new Pope has named himself Celestine in the centuries since. He hardly
offered a sparkling precedent for Benedict’s decision.
Francis’s
tenure has made clearer every day that the resignation would mean a
departure from at least the recent past. Francis, who is eighty-one,
recently celebrated the fifth anniversary of his ascension to the
office, but he still seems fundamentally new. After the conclave that
culminated in his election, on the way to his inaugural Mass at the
Sistine Chapel, he made sure to be photographed handling his own
baggage, looking more like a tourist or a pilgrim than a Pontiff. He
opted for simple black shoes, in pointed contrast to Benedict’s red
leather numbers. Even his chosen name—he’s the first Pope to name
himself Francis, after St. Francis of Assisi, and the first Pope in more
than a millennium to choose a name that had not been chosen
before—hinted at a radical simplicity. He has not written the sort of
scholarly tracts for which Benedict will be remembered, but he has
produced “Happiness in This Life”
(Random House), a collection of peppy one-liners, almost self-helpish
in tone, culled from his encyclicals and sermons. “There is one word
that I want to say to you: joy! ” Francis declares. “Never be sad, men and women: A Christian should never be sad! Never let yourself be discouraged!”
Francis seems less intent on altering the Church’s most controversial doctrines than on exhibiting boredom
with the whole angst-ridden discourse that surrounds them. When he was
asked about footnote 351, shortly after “Amoris Laetitia” was published,
he said that he couldn’t remember it. Earlier in his papacy, while
fielding questions from the Vatican press corps on a plane, he was asked
about the Church’s stance on homosexuality. He replied, “Who am I to
judge?” It sounded more like a plea to move past the issue than like an
actual invocation of humility. (After all, when it comes to society’s
market-driven indifference to the poor, or even to Francis’s pet
theological causes, such as devotion to the Virgin Mary, he is not shy
about offering judgments.) Francis quickly became popular in the press,
and among liberal non-Catholics. After the worst years of the
clerical-abuse crisis in the Church, here was a leader who embodied
Catholicism’s lastingly positive, if comparatively abstract,
associations. (Few of us imagine ourselves as opposed to love, mercy,
and human dignity.) He sounded willing, even eager, to leave the less
comfortable conversations—about divorce, contraception,
homosexuality—behind.
But the appeal of the institution of the
Papacy, for many, lies in its promise of constancy. According to
Catholic teaching, the office was created when Christ named the apostle
Peter the first leader of the Church, saying, in a pun on the Greek
meaning of Peter’s name, “Upon this rock will I build my church.” The
more impressive the edifice you’d like to build, the more important a
stable base becomes. Today, under Francis, and in the wake of Benedict’s
resignation—he is now Pope Emeritus, a title that has never existed
before—the Papacy has become the site for unexpected shifts and
discontinuities. Hence, in part, the fierce reactions of Francis’s
critics, some of whom, like Spaemann, have come to understand the clash
over “Amoris” as a crisis. In becoming implicitly more amenable to
divorce—and, by extension, to other ills of the wider culture—the
Church, they worry, might cease, permanently, in any recognizable way,
to be itself.
This unsettling state of affairs is the subject of “To Change the Church: Pope Francis and the Future of Catholicism” (Simon & Schuster), a new book by the conservative Times
columnist Ross Douthat. As the controversy over “Amoris Laetitia” has
grown, the thirty-eight-year-old Douthat has become perhaps the most
prominent lay critic of Francis’s papacy. In that unofficial capacity,
he has duelled in print, in public conversations, and, often, on
Twitter, with many of Francis’s defenders, including Antonio Spadaro, an
Italian Jesuit priest and journalist who is thought to be one of the
Pope’s closest confidants outside the Vatican. Almost uniquely among
mainstream commentators, Douthat has been willing to suggest the
possibility that Francis will spark a genuine schism between liberals
and conservatives. His previous book, on the quirky diversity—and, in
his view, the errancy—of Christianity in America, is titled “Bad
Religion: How We Became a Nation of Heretics.” In “To Change the
Church,” one sometimes senses a barely constrained wish to apply the
H-word to Francis himself—a wish suppressed only, perhaps, by a last
shred or two of institutional deference.
The
book opens, oddly, with an extended meditation on Douthat’s own
religious history and on the mixture of sensibilities that, he admits,
might color, or even compromise, his assessment of “Amoris” and the
Pope. Douthat was born into Protestantism, wobbling along the
seldom-travelled border between Pentecostal fire and the polite
mainstream. He converted to Catholicism as a teen-ager, freely but under
the influence of his spiritually itinerant mother. “So in the world of
cradle Catholics and adult converts, groups that are often contrasted
with one another and occasionally find themselves at odds, I belong to
the little-known third category in between,” he explains. He casts his
life as a Christian as similarly divided—often doubtful and ironic where
others seem, to him, naturally pious and enviably prone to untroubled
belief. “Sometimes I felt as though my conversion was incomplete,
awaiting some further grace or transformation,” he writes. “At others I
felt that I belonged to a category of Catholics that used to be common
in Catholic novels . . . the good bad Catholic or the bad good one,
whose loyalty was stronger than his faith and whose faith was stronger
than his practice, but who didn’t want the church to change all the
rules to make his practice easier because then what would really be the
point?”
The story of Francis’s papacy is in part a regional story:
prelates from wealthier European countries, where ancient cathedrals
increasingly sit empty, have, in their eagerness to encourage
congregants to return, been more likely to support the liberal
interpretations of “Amoris.” Meanwhile, representatives of the newly
dynamic Church in the global South—especially Africa, where Catholicism
is in a pitched battle with charismatic and, often, prosperity-promising
denominations—have hewed to traditionalism. (The German Benedict and
the Latin-American Francis occupy ironic positions in this divide;
Benedict is something of an anomaly among his countrymen, and the
brashness of Francis, the Argentine son of Italian immigrants, may stem
in part from his upbringing in a place in which, at the time,
Catholicism still amounted to a total culture.) Douthat notes these
divisions, but refrains, amid his other confessions, from turning the
geographic mirror on himself. The American Church is proportionally
smaller, and more embattled, than many of its counterparts elsewhere;
for years, immigration has been its sole source of consistent growth.
And our country’s rapidly fragmenting
political and cultural landscape casts frightening shadows when held up
against a Church that continues its choppy engagement with an
increasingly irreligious West.
At
first blush, the Church might appear to be as plagued by splintering as
so much of American life is: besides the rough liberal-conservative
divide that, in its current form, has persisted since the sixties, there
are also Catholic socialists, Catholic Trumpists, liberation
theologians, liturgical traditionalists lamenting the loss of the old
Latin Mass, and ultramontane restorationists who hint at their hopes for
a return to theocracy—and who, by implication, dismiss both liberals
and conservatives as modernists who have been led astray by pluralistic
democracy, and by the false hope of convergence with the wider world.
But
these factions are, ideally, united by a sense of eschatology via
history: a hope that they are all journeying, however imperfectly,
together, toward God. These days, this would seem to constitute a major
point of attraction, especially to a certain kind of politically
interested American spiritual seeker. In the secular realm, we carry out
our arguments—and develop our politics, each of us an
autodidact—without the benefit of a common moral language or the bedrock
of shared premises, and we sometimes appear fated, therefore, to
retreat to our various ideological corners for good. The Catholicism of a
figure like Benedict, with his faith in the legibility of earthly and
spiritual experience, presents a salve for this condition. Its adherents
might squabble, but their differences lead them back, eventually, to a
mutual inheritance: the words of Jesus in the Gospels, the lives of the
saints, the rhythms of the liturgy, the catechism of the Church. This
common ground might not prompt agreement, but it can result in
understanding, and in something like harmony. One of my favorite genres
of Catholic literature is the book-length interview: the Pope or some
other high-ranking churchman sits down with a reporter or other layman,
both operating on the assumption that conversation tends toward truth.
(Francis has participated in more than one of these books; the most
recent was just published in Italy, under the title “God Is Young.”)
In his most effective columns for the Times,
Douthat, a staunch social conservative who nonetheless manages to
project a tone of Gen X knowingness and mild ennui, is not so much an
ideological champion or purveyor of contrarian opinion as a cunning
interpreter. As the Times’ Op-Ed section has become
the subject of internecine media controversy, largely over the quality
and the usefulness of its conservative contributorship, Douthat stands
as the cleverest and least predictable writer there. He means to
persuade—or, at least, to subtly reroute the grooves of reasoning by
which his wary readers arrive at their reliably liberal positions. But
he usually tries to do so by breezing past the most radical implications
of his ideas. In one recent column, he offered a rationale for why
liberals should welcome a nativist like the White House policy staffer
and speechwriter Stephen Miller at the table of the immigration debate,
presenting several benign-sounding arguments for Miller’s pretty gross
position on the subject without ever letting slip whether he shares it.
He
isn’t so coy in “To Change the Church”—the sincerity of his alarm with
respect to Francis won’t allow it. But the book’s best chapters are
vehicles for his genuine understanding of more liberal co-religionists,
and for his ability to parrot their most compelling arguments, skewing
them nearly imperceptibly on the way to chopping them down. One of his
signature rhetorical maneuvers is to render, in as plain and unmocking a
manner as possible, two partisan stories about—or, as the liberal slur
goes, “both sides”
of—a given phenomenon or event, and then to clear a path through the
middle, revealing the gulf between them to be the result of virtually
irreconcilable patterns of thought. In one impressive and quietly comic
section of “To Change the Church,” he recounts the aftermath of the
Second Vatican Council three times, from three points of view, setting
exaggerated tribal grievances next to details of undeniable truth, as if
slowly turning over events in order to find an acceptably clean ground
for conversation.
His third version of the Vatican II story, the
one he considers to be closest to the truth, presents a dialectic. The
council, which took place from 1962 to 1965, produced, under the
guidance of, first, Pope John XXIII, and then Pope Paul VI, a new
framework for Catholic engagement with modernity. Amity between the
Church and other denominations, as well as non-Christian religions, was
encouraged; the legacy of Catholic anti-Semitism was roundly denounced;
it became licit, for the first time, to celebrate the liturgy in
vernacular languages, instead of in Latin. Suddenly—according to
liberals, who regard John XXIII as a hero—the doors of the Church were
open as never before. But John Paul II and Benedict sought to dispel any
notion of an ecclesial revolution, and, during their papacies,
conservative Catholics largely accepted their argument that Vatican II
was completely compatible with the doctrinal dispensations that had
preceded it. Progressives retreated, hoping for a liberal Pontiff to
arrive soon and revive the world-embracing Vatican II spirit.
The
fear that Douthat expresses in “To Change the Church” is that Francis’s
foray into theological innovation with “Amoris” threatens to drag these
unresolved tensions into the light—and, perhaps, to aggravate them
beyond repair. The book is characteristically well
written, and makes impressive use of theological crises from centuries
past in order to contextualize Francis in the long, often fractious
sweep of Catholic history. But at Douthat’s moments of greatest alarm,
he seems determined to set aside the surprises, the reversals, and the
lingering irresolution that one finds in that history. Francis, he
complains throughout the book, is too often ambiguous; Douthat believes
that the ambiguity is strategic, a way to mask a subterranean desire to
change Catholicism for good. In the Church’s past, however, uncertainty
has sometimes been the rule for decades, even centuries, before its
ancient teachings have groped their way into coherence with the cultures
and the times at hand. Francis appears cognizant that his turn at the
helm comes at such a tenuous moment—the abuse scandal and Benedict’s
resignation insured as much—and he appears determined to keep his
balance for as long as tension persists.
In his position at the Times,
Douthat is an essentially, if covertly, evangelistic writer, and he is
most convincing when his tone is irenic, funny, and self-deprecating,
and when he is willing to trade small, stubborn differences for broader
agreements—when, in other words, he most closely resembles Francis. Both
hope to win a soul or two, and both come across as willing, given their
surroundings, to make a few compromises in the winning. Sounding
briefly Benedictine in the preface, Douthat says that his book “is
conservative, in the sense that it assumes the church needs a settled
core of doctrine, a clear unbroken link to the New Testament and the
early church, for Catholicism’s claims and structure and demands to make
any sense at all.” But Douthat’s proposed solutions to the crisis, like
his historical analyses and his disposition, are more pragmatic than
truly traditionalist. He suggests more than once, for instance, that the
worldwide Church might perhaps follow the American Church’s lead in
widening access to annulments and in speeding up the process for
obtaining them. The functional reality would be roughly the same as that
expressed by the new Franciscan paradigm—people moving from one set of
marriage vows to another, receiving Communion at both the start and the
end of the journey—but the surrounding forms would be stable enough to
claim continuity. Douthat often sounds like a symptom of the dissonances
that Francis seeks to resolve.
In February, Benedict, who will soon turn ninety-one, wrote to the Italian newspaper Corriere della Sera, announcing that he was on a “pilgrimage towards Home.”
The impression of Benedict as a scholar-ascetic, hunched over a stack
of papers, writing or reading or lost in a moment of prayer, has
deepened during the five years since his abdication of the Petrine
throne and his scrupulously kept vow to allow his successor to rule
without fear of contradiction. In March, the Vatican published an
eleven-book series, by eleven different authors, titled “The Theology of
Pope Francis,” and its head of communications, Monsignor Dario Viganò,
revealed, at a press conference, that he had asked Benedict to offer his
thoughts, in the form of “a page or a page and a half of dense theology
in his clear and punctual style.” Benedict declined, writing a short
letter, a photograph of which Viganò presented to the public—a page of
type, under Benedict’s terse letterhead: “Benedict XVI, Papa emeritus.”
In the picture, only one paragraph is legible; it contains a rebuke to
those who place stock in the opposing caricatures of the two
Popes—Benedict as cloistered academic and Francis as untutored
operator—and insists on a deeper “interior continuity” between their
papacies.
Benedict is surely right to push back against those
depictions. For all Francis’s facility with symbols and grand gestures,
he has not instituted a break from Church teaching but, rather, a shift
in focus from text to practice, from household rules to daily life. He
is not, as some of his most strident critics have implied, indifferent
to doctrine; it is more that his emphases, and his cryptic silences,
have helped coax into view an ideal long cherished by liberal—and,
often, lapsed—Catholics: a Church whose appeal lies in its engagement
with, and not its retreat from, the wider world. It is unclear whether
Francis sees himself in this light. Sometimes he seems to be a figure of
convenience for political and cultural élites who have tried, mostly
unsuccessfully, to marshal his universalist message against the recent
global upswing of nativist-nationalist political sentiment—while, at the
same time, and mostly successfully, resisting or ignoring his critiques
of modern technology and economics.
The Vatican presented
Benedict’s letter as an endorsement of Francis, delivered at a moment of
growing conservative criticism, but it soon became clear that something
was amiss. Reporters from the Associated Press noticed that the bottom
two lines on the page in the photograph were slightly blurred, and that
the entire second page of the letter was nowhere to be seen. After an
outcry from the media and from members of the Church, the rest of the
text, in Italian, was released. Benedict’s diplomacy, it turned out,
wasn’t so complete. He had expressed disappointment at the inclusion in
the series of a theologian who had previously directed “anti-papist”
attacks at him, and he revealed that he hadn’t read the books at all.
Amid the ensuing rancor over the deception, Viganò resigned.
The episode, almost slapstick in its clumsiness, evoked the persistent, if mostly marginal, murmurings of some
reactionaries that Benedict remains the true Pope, having been
manipulated into resigning by a corrupt—and, in the most conspiratorial
accounts, largely gay—Vatican bureaucracy that was fed up with his
fealty to doctrine. The truth, by most reasonable tellings, is less
sensational: Benedict was at John Paul II’s side as he slid into
helplessness in the years before his death, and saw the disorientation
that a dying Pope could sow among his flock. The Church is still
foundering from the sexual-abuse crisis, and, in his final years,
Benedict didn’t trust himself to steer the faithful past the shoals.
Francis has not inspired much more confidence on that score: he has
tended to be dismissive of, and sometimes even hostile toward, the
critics of bishops and other prelates who enabled decades of wicked
behavior. The problem of priestly abuse might indeed be the sturdiest
link between Francis and Benedict—and a lingering reminder that what has
most grievously afflicted the Church in recent decades came not from
the outer world, but from within. ♦
Pope Francis and the Footnote That Could Split the Catholic Church
What could a Protestant – even more, a Baptist – have to say about Pope Francis’ new exhortation on marriage and the family, Amoris Laetitia?
I feel the irony in reading and commenting on a papal document on the
same day I am heading to a conference whose theme is “We Are
Protestant.”
But I believe it is important for us to keep an eye on Roman
Catholicism’s doctrinal developments and pastoral application in part
because, whether we like it or not, the pope is the face for
Catholicism, and Catholicism is, globally speaking, the most visible
face for Christianity as a religion. Which means that, even for those of
us who reject the office of the papacy and are at odds with Catholic
teaching on a number of essential points of doctrine (most importantly,
the doctrine of justification by faith alone), the pope’s exposition of
Catholic teaching on marriage, children, and the family will be
discussed as if it is the Christian position on these matters.
Thankfully, when it comes to marriage and family, there is considerable overlap between
Catholics and evangelicals, most notably on issues related to the gift
of gender and male-female complementarity as essential to marriage.
There are also some important differences: evangelicals do not believe
marriage to be a sacrament or that the union is indissoluble. Most
evangelicals freely welcome repentant divorced and remarried couples to
the Lord’s Table and accept the legitimacy of some forms of birth
control forbidden by the Church.
So, when it comes to internal squabbles over Catholic teaching and
practice, conservative evangelicals are in an awkward position. Because
we disagree with the papacy and with Catholic doctrine in a number of
places, our differences with Catholicism are usually more profound and
foundational than the disagreements between conservative and progressive
Catholics. On some contested issues, we disagree with the most
conservative of Catholics, and yet strangely enough, don’t want the
Church to change its teaching because we hold precious many of the other
truths that Catholic teaching on marriage protects. We worry that
change in one area might eventually jeopardize other, more foundational
doctrines.
The Background for Catholic Controversy
That leads us to one of the most pressing issues in the Catholic
Church today. Some bishops have advocated for a change in doctrine
regarding the indissolubility of marriage, to allow divorced and
remarried couples to partake of the Eucharist. Other bishops have pushed
back against such an idea, partly because it poses a direct challenge
to the internal consistency of Catholic teaching throughout the
centuries, and because it would imply that second and third marriages
(while the previous spouses are still living) are acceptable in the eyes
of the Church.
You need to understand the ongoing debate about admitting remarried
couples to the Eucharist if you’re going to understand the controversy
surrounding Francis’ recent apostolic exhortation. From the outset in Amoris Laetitia,
Francis makes clear that he is trying to steer a middle way. He shuns
people who have “an immoderate desire for total change without
sufficient reflection or grounding” as well as the “attitude that would
solve everything by applying general rules or deriving undue conclusions
from particular theological considerations.” In other words, he’s
saying, “I’ve got liberals on the left and fundamentalists on the right.
I’m choosing a middle road.”
That middle road looks like this: Francis will uphold historic
Catholic teaching, while cracking open the door for freedom among local
priests making pastoral decisions. Throughout the document, he pits
pastoral compassion against doctrinal fidelity, as if one gets in the
way of the other. And he pushes change by sliding a footnote under the
door, a footnote that could lead to greater divisions in the Catholic
Church. (More on that below…)
Here’s what I’m going to do in this lengthy post. I’m going to
summarize and quote from some of the most important parts of the
document. At the end, I’m going to get to the most controversial aspect
(including that footnote). If you want to skip the summary, go to the
bottom of this post.
Why Marriage is In Trouble
Much of this exhortation is devoted to explaining the trends that
make it harder to enter into and sustain healthy marriages today. At
times, Francis sounds like Charles Taylor, the philosopher who coined
the phrase “The Age of Authenticity” as an apt description of Western Culture. Francis writes why ‘authenticity’ is both good and bad:
“We rightly value a personalism
that opts for authenticity as opposed to mere conformity. While this can
favour spontaneity and a better use of people’s talents, if misdirected
it can foster attitudes of constant suspicion, fear of commitment,
self-centredness and arrogance. Freedom of choice makes it possible to
plan our lives and to make the most of ourselves. Yet if this freedom
lacks noble goals or personal discipline, it degenerates into an
inability to give oneself generously to others.” (para. 33)
Next, Francis explains what this view of authenticity does to our vision of marriage:
“When these factors affect our
understanding of the family, it can come to be seen as a way station,
helpful when convenient, or a setting in which rights can be asserted
while relationships are left to the changing winds of personal desire
and circumstances. Ultimately, it is easy nowadays to confuse genuine
freedom with the idea that each individual can act arbitrarily, as if
there were no truths, values and principles to provide guidance, and
everything were possible and permissible. The ideal of marriage, marked
by a commitment to exclusivity and stability, is swept aside whenever it
proves inconvenient or tiresome. The fear of loneliness and the desire
for stability and fidelity exist side by side with a growing fear of
entrapment in a relationship that could hamper the achievement of one’s
personal goals.” (para. 34)
Here, Francis has put his finger on the cultural trends that make
marriage difficult in our age. “To believe that we are good simply
because ‘we feel good’ is a tremendous illusion,” he writes (para. 145).
Because of these cultural developments, divorce is widespread.
“It is becoming more and more
common to think that, when one or both partners no longer feel
fulfilled, or things have not turned out the way they wanted, sufficient
reason exists to end the marriage. Were this the case, no marriage
would last.” (para. 237)
The Christian Doctrine of Marriage
The response to these challenges is to uphold the beauty of Christian
teaching on marriage, a move that should cheer conservatives in the
Church. Marriage mirrors the Trinitarian God (para. 11, 29, 121) and is a
public institution with benefits for the world (para. 31, 131, 181,
184). Birth Control Amoris Laetitia reaffirms the Catholic prohibition of birth
control, but it does so by showing the beautiful openness to life
inherent in this teaching:
“From the outset, love refuses
every impulse to close in on itself; it is open to a fruitfulness that
draws it beyond itself. Hence no genital act of husband and wife can
refuse this meaning, even when for various reasons it may not always in
fact beget a new life.” (para. 80)
Abortion
On abortion, Francis urges us to consider the value of the embryo and to see new life with the “eyes of God” (para. 170):
“Here I feel it urgent to state
that, if the family is the sanctuary of life, the place where life is
conceived and cared for, it is a horrendous contradiction when it
becomes a place where life is rejected and destroyed. So great is the
value of a human life, and so inalienable the right to life of an
innocent child growing in the mother’s womb, that no alleged right to
one’s own body can justify a decision to terminate that life, which is
an end in itself and which can never be considered the ‘property’ of
another human being.” (para. 83)
Same-Sex Marriage
Not surprisingly, the document contains multiple wholesale rejections
of the idea that same-sex unions are marriages. “There are absolutely
no grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or
even remotely analogous to God’s plan for marriage and family,” he
writes (para. 251). He worries about the “legal deconstruction of the
family” in many countries, and the rise of models “based almost
exclusively on the autonomy of the individual will” (para 53), and he
decries the pressure exerted by international bodies that would make
financial aid to poor countries “dependent on the introduction of laws
to establish ‘marriage’ between persons of the same sex” (para. 251).
Even so, Francis believes that “every person, regardless of sexual
orientation, ought to be respected in his or her dignity and treated
with consideration, while ‘every sign of unjust discrimination’ is to be
carefully avoided, particularly any form of aggression and violence”
(para. 250). Transgender Ideology
Francis connects marriage and family by reaffirming the right of
every child to “receive love from a mother and a father” (para. 172),
because “the clear and well-defined presence of both figures, female and
male, creates the environment best suited to the growth of the child”
(para. 175). That emphasis on “male and female” is clear in his outright
rejection of the ideology of the Transgender movement as well as its
legal agenda:
“Yet another challenge is posed
by the various forms of an ideology of gender that denies the difference
and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and envisages a society
without sexual differences, thereby eliminating the anthropological
basis of the family. This ideology leads to educational programmes and
legislative enactments that promote a personal identity and emotional
intimacy radically separated from the biological difference between male
and female. Consequently, human identity becomes the choice of the
individual, one which can also change over time… It is one thing to be
understanding of human weakness and the complexities of life, and
another to accept ideologies that attempt to sunder what are inseparable
aspects of reality. Let us not fall into the sin of trying to replace
the Creator. We are creatures, and not omnipotent. Creation is prior to
us and must be received as a gift. At the same time, we are called to
protect our humanity, and this means, in the first place, accepting it
and respecting it as it was created.” (para. 56)
Freedom for Priests to Bend Church Teaching?
This document tries to steer a course between doctrinal faithfulness
and pastoral compassion, and as I mentioned above, Francis often pits
fidelity and compassion against each another. He warns about the “trap”
of “wasting our energy in doleful laments” and advocates instead “new
forms of missionary creativity” (para. 57). He urges patience and
respect for people who are not living up to the ideal of Christianity’s
vision of marriage, noting that “irregular unions” can have good
features (para. 78). He asks pastors to “avoid judgments that do not
take into account the complexity of various situations, and they are to
be attentive, by necessity, to how people experience and endure distress
because of their condition” (para. 79).
On the matter of divorced and remarried people, Francis reminds the
Church that they remain part of the ‘ecclesial community,’ and deserving
of care and counsel.
“The Christian community’s care
of such persons is not to be considered a weakening of its faith and
testimony to the indissolubility of marriage; rather, such care is a
particular expression of its charity” (para. 243).
The key sections on “irregular” situations come near the end of the
document. Francis decries the flaunting of “objective sin as if it were
part of the Christian ideal” and calls for the conversion of such
people, which indicates that anyone pushing for a wholesale change of
Christian teaching on divorce, marriage, or same-sex unions, show
themselves to be “separate from the community” (para. 297). (Not much
hope here for revisionists captive to the Sexual Revolution’s ideology.)
But what of people who are divorced and civilly remarried? It’s clear
that they can participate in the life of the Church, but can they
partake of the Eucharist? That’s the crucial point where Francis pivots
to local discretion.
“What is possible is simply a
renewed encouragement to undertake a responsible personal and pastoral
discernment of particular cases, one which would recognize that, since
‘the degree of responsibility is not equal in all cases’, the
consequences or effects of a rule need not necessarily always be the
same…” (para. 300).
Francis believes the “individual conscience needs to be better
incorporated into the Church’s praxis.” In other words, patience with
people who need their consciences to be better formed by the gospel, but
openness to participate in all aspects of church life so as to bring
them along to that greater formation.
In a footnote Francis adds:
“In certain cases, this can
include the help of the sacraments. Hence, ‘I want to remind priests
that the confessional must not be a torture chamber, but rather an
encounter with the Lord’s mercy’.”
Depending on future developments, that may be the footnote that
splits the Catholic Church. I’m not a Catholic historian and don’t want
to overstate the significance of this encyclical or this footnote, but
stranger things have happened – like when the Eastern and Western Church
split in 1054 over the “filioque clause” of the Nicene Creed. Of
course, the East / West split involved many issues, dating back
centuries, but the same is true today. There have been various fault
lines in the Catholic Church for decades, and who knows? What if this
particular footnote became the moral filioque of the 21st century, exposing existing fault lines and irreparably dividing the church?
Shortly thereafter, Francis writes:
“I understand those who prefer a
more rigorous pastoral care which leaves no room for confusion. But I
sincerely believe that Jesus wants a Church attentive to the goodness
which the Holy Spirit sows in the midst of human weakness, a Mother who,
while clearly expressing her objective teaching, always does what good
she can, even if in the process, her shoes get soiled by the mud of the
street.”
Conclusion and Responses from Catholic Thinkers
Already, Catholics are reacting to this document, with some
disappointed that Francis’ reforms don’t go further and others
discouraged that his reforms only widen the split between
traditionalists and liberals. As an evangelical, I’m keeping my ears
attuned to this conversation and will occasionally link to commentaries
and articles that show how Catholics are processing the new
developments.
Below are a few responses from Catholic thinkers.
Ross Douthat, a Catholic columnist in the New York Times, describes liberal
and conservative Catholic wings as co-existing in a “low-grade civil
war” with a “tension between doctrine and practice, in which the
church’s official teaching remains conservative even as the everyday
life of Catholicism is shot through with disagreement, relativism,
dissent.” In Douthat’s view, Pope Francis has reaffirmed this truce in a
way that gives hope to the liberal wing.
This move means that the truce is still in effect,
but its terms have distinctly changed. There is still a formal teaching
that remarriage without an annulment is adultery, that adultery is a
mortal sin, that people who persist in mortal sins should not receive
communion. And there is no structure or system in
church life that contradicts any of this. This much conservatives still
have, and it’s enough to stave off a sense of immediate theological
crisis.
But there is also now a new papal teaching: A teaching in favor of the truce itself. That
is, the post-1960s separation between doctrine and pastoral practice
now has a papal imprimatur, rather than being a state of affairs that
popes were merely tolerating for the sake of unity. Indeed, for Pope
Francis that separation is clearly a hoped-for source of renewal,
revival and revitalization, rather than something that renewal or
revival might enable the church to gradually transcend.
Again, this is not the clear change of doctrine, the
proof of concept for other changes, that many liberal bishops and
cardinals sought. But it is an encouragement for innovation on the
ground, for the de facto changes that more sophisticated
liberal Catholics believe will eventually render certain uncomfortable
doctrines as dead letters without the need for a formal repudiation from
the top.
Former priest James Carroll, writing in The New Yorker,sees
this document as affirming his previous practice of using pastoral
compassion as a way to defy the Church’s official teaching:
Priests like me, in counselling our fellow-Catholics,
operated under the rubric of the so-called pastoral solution, which
allowed us to quietly defy Vatican dogma when the situation seemed to
call for it. In the confessional booth or the rectory parlor, we could
encourage our parishioners to decide for themselves, by examining their
own consciences, whether the doctrine of the Church applied to them in
their particular circumstance…
Francis’s watchword is mercy, but mercy adheres,
first, not in alterations of doctrine but in the new way that Catholics
are invited to think of doctrine…
Pope Francis’s emphasis on mercy toward the divorced
and remarried doesn’t only mean that those people will more freely
partake of Communion. It also means that the doctrine of the
indissolubility of marriage, however much it is still held up as an
ideal, will not grip the moral imagination of the Church as it once did.
Writing for Crux, Carl Olson believes the document starts strong but then unravels due to its own internal inconsistencies.
Conservative Catholic writer, George Weigel, believes the document upholds Catholic teaching and forbids a departure from that doctrine in practice:
As this discussion unfolds, it will be important to keep in mind that AL
cites the Final Report of the 2015 Synod on the key point: that all
pastoral accompaniment of the divorced and civilly remarried, including
discernment of ways in which they can be better integrated into the life
of the Catholic community, is to take place “according to the teaching
of the Church” — which means, in this context, the Church’s settled
teaching on indissolubility and on worthiness to receive holy communion.
It will also be important to keep in mind, as this discussion
continues, that the kind of pastoral accompaniment and discernment so
strongly urged by Pope Francis is in fact what goes on in the Catholic
parishes and dioceses with which I’m most familiar. There are
exceptions, I’m sure, and I’ve heard my share of horror stories about
unfeeling and incompetent priests — and they are horrific, and
disgraceful. But the priests and bishops I know bend every possible
effort to be sensitive to difficult situations, and to see how they
might be resolved in ways that serve both mercy and truth.
Related
SPLIT?
Several
dozen tradition-minded Roman Catholic theologians, priests and
academics have formally accused Pope Francis of spreading heresy with
his 2016 opening to divorced and civilly remarried Catholics.
“So
he carried me away in the spirit into the wilderness: and I saw a woman
sit upon a scarlet coloured beast, full of names of blasphemy, having
seven heads and ten horns. And the woman was arrayed in purple and
scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls,
having a golden cup in her hand full of abominations and filthiness of
her fornication: And upon her forehead was a name written, MYSTERY,
BABYLON THE GREAT, THE MOTHER OF HARLOTS AND ABOMINATIONS OF THE EARTH.”Revelation 17:13-15 (KJV) In a 25-page letter delivered
to Pope Francis last month and provided Saturday to The Associated
Press, the 62 signatories issued a “filial correction” to the pope — a
measure they said hadn’t been employed since the 14th century.
The
letter accused Pope Francis of propagating seven heretical positions
concerning marriage, moral life and the sacraments with his 2016
document “The Joy of Love” and subsequent “acts, words and omissions.”
The
initiative follows another formal act by four tradition-minded
cardinals who wrote Francis last year asking him to clarify a series of
questions, or “dubbia,” they had about his 2016 text.
Pope
Francis hasn’t responded to either initiative. The Vatican spokesman
didn’t immediately respond to an email seeking comment late Saturday.
None of the signatories
of the new letter is a cardinal, and the highest-ranking churchman
listed is actually someone whose organization has no legal standing in
the Catholic Church: Bishop Bernard Fellay, superior of the breakaway
Society of St. Pius X. Several other signatories are well-known admirers
of the old Latin Mass which Fellay’s followers celebrate.
But
organizers said the initiative was nevertheless significant and a sign
of the concern among a certain contingent of academics and pastors over
Francis’ positions, which they said posed a danger to the faithful.
“There
is a role for theologians and philosophers to explain to people the
church’s teaching, to correct misunderstandings,” said Joseph Shaw, a
spokesman for the initiative, signatory of the correction and senior
research fellow in moral philosophy at Oxford University.
When it was released in April 2016, “The Joy of Love”
immediately sparked controversy because it opened the door to letting
civilly remarried Catholics receive Communion. Church teaching holds
that unless these Catholics obtain an annulment — a church decree that
their first marriage was invalid — they cannot receive the sacraments,
since they are seen as committing adultery.
Francis didn’t create a
church-wide pass for these Catholics, but suggested — in vague terms
and strategically placed footnotes — that bishops and priests could do
so on a case-by-case basis after accompanying them on a spiritual
journey of discernment. Subsequent comments and writings have made clear
he intended such wiggle room, part of his belief that God’s mercy
extends in particular to sinners and that the Eucharist isn’t a prize
for the perfect but nourishment for the weak.
Shaw said none of
the four cardinals involved in the initial “dubbia” letter, nor any
other cardinal, was involved in the “filial correction.”
Will Pope Francis Break the Church?
The new pope's choices
stir high hopes among liberal Catholics and intense uncertainty among
conservatives. Deep divisions may lie ahead.
In 1979, almost a year into the papacy of John Paul II, a novel called The Vicar of Christ spent 13 weeks on the New York Times
best-seller list. The work of a Princeton legal scholar, Walter F.
Murphy, it featured an unlikely papal candidate named Declan Walsh—first
a war hero, then a United States Supreme Court justice, and then (after
an affair and his wife’s untimely death) a monk—who is summoned to the
throne of Saint Peter by a deadlocked, desperate conclave.
Once
elevated, Walsh takes the name Francesco—that is, Francis—and sets about
using the office in extraordinary ways. He launches a global crusade
against hunger, staffed by Catholic youth and funded by the sale of
Vatican treasures. He intervenes repeatedly in world conflicts, at one
point flying into Tel Aviv during an Arab bombing campaign. He lays
plans to gradually reverse the Church’s teachings on contraception and
clerical celibacy, and banishes conservative cardinals to monastic life
when they plot against him. He flirts with the Arian heresy, which
doubted Jesus’s full divinity, and he embraces Quaker-style religious
pacifism, arguing that just-war theory is out of date in an age of
nuclear arms and total war. (This last move eventually gets him
assassinated, probably by one of the governments threatened by his quest
for peace.)
Murphy’s
book is mostly forgotten, but his hook, the idea of a progressive pope
who sets out to bring sweeping change to Catholicism, has endured in the
cultural imagination. The priest-novelist Andrew M. Greeley’s 1996
potboiler White Smoke, for instance, culminates in the election
of a modernizing Spanish cardinal, whose conservative opponents are
undone by the wily politicking of two Irish American prelates. Two years
ago, Showtime shot a pilot for a series called The Vatican, in which Kyle Chandler (a k a Coach Taylor from Friday Night Lights)
played a rising-star New York cardinal with progressive views—only to
spike the show, perhaps feeling overtaken by events, 10 months after
Pope Benedict XVI unexpectedly resigned.
The possibility of a
revolutionary pope isn’t one that most Vatican-watchers have taken
seriously, and not only because a college of cardinals with members
appointed by John Paul and Benedict seemed unlikely to elevate a true
wild card to the office. The reality is that popes are rarely the great
protagonists of Catholic dramas. They are circumscribed by tradition and
hemmed in by bureaucracy, and on vexing issues Rome tends to move last,
after arguments have been thrashed out for generations.
Yet
now we have a Pope Francesco in the flesh, and elements of Murphy’s
vision have come to pass, or so it seems: the attention-grabbing breaks
with papal protocol, the interventions in global politics, the reopening
of moral issues that his predecessors had deemed settled, and the blend
of public humility and skillful exploitation—including the cashiering
of opponents—of the papal office and its powers.
The
Church is not yet in the grip of a revolution. The limits, theological
and practical, on papal power are still present, and the man who was
Jorge Bergoglio has not done anything that explicitly puts them to the
test. But his moves and choices (and the media coverage thereof) have
generated a revolutionary atmosphere around Catholicism. For the moment,
at least, there is a sense that a new springtime has arrived for the
Church’s progressives. And among some conservative Catholics, there is a
feeling of uncertainty absent since the often-chaotic aftermath of the
Second Vatican Council, in the 1960s and ’70s.
That unease has
coexisted with a tendency to deny that anything has really changed since
the former cardinal and archbishop of Buenos Aires became pope. From
the first unscripted shocker—his “Who am I to judge?” in response to a
reporter’s question about gay priests—many conservative Catholics have
argued that the press is seeing what it wants to see in the new pontiff.
Taking his comments and gestures out of context, reporters are imposing
a Declan Walsh frame on a reality in which continuity is still the
order of the day.
The conservative observers are often right. Some
of Francis’s gestures mirror moves his predecessors made to less
fanfare or acclaim. Some of his forays into world affairs, like the
opening to Cuba, build on Vatican diplomatic efforts begun before his
time. Some of his leftward-tilting public statements—the critiques of
global capitalism, the stress on environmental stewardship—are in step
with the rhetoric of both John Paul and Benedict. Some of his
headline-grabbing comments (on the compatibility of Catholic doctrine
and evolutionary theory, say) get attention only because certain
reporters have no real clue about what Catholicism teaches; others (like
his alleged promise that pets go to heaven) because journalists will
believe any story that fits the “maverick pope” narrative.
Yet
the media are not deceived in thinking that Francis differs from his
predecessors in substance as well as style. He may not be a liberal
Catholic as the term is understood in an American or European context,
but he has a different set of priorities than the previous two popes
did. He reads the times differently, and elements of his agenda are
clearly in tune with what many progressive Catholics (and progressives,
period) in the West have long hoped for from the Church.
The exact details of that agenda can sometimes be difficult to discern. Phrases like master of ambiguity
circulate among admirers and critics alike. But there are now a number
of biographies of Francis/Bergoglio in English, and three of them, read
together, give a provisional sense of where this pope is coming from.
They also suggest why his pontificate, without being as deliberately
revolutionary as the reigns of the liberal popes of fiction, might have
dramatic consequences for the Church. The arc of Bergoglio’s
life and career follows a literary script: youthful success, defeat and
exile, unexpected vindication and ascent. Each of his three biographers
approaches the story in a different way. Elisabetta Piqué, a
correspondent for the Argentine newspaper La Nación, has written an intensely personal work (Bergoglio baptized her two children); her Pope Francis: Life and Revolution draws richly on interviews with Argentinians touched by Bergoglio’s pastoral work. The Great Reformer: Francis and the Making of a Radical Pope,
by the British Catholic journalist Austen Ivereigh, has the widest
angle and the most depth, taking in Argentina’s distinctive history as
well as the particular trajectory of its now most famous son. In Pope Francis: Untying the Knots, Paul Vallely, another British Catholic writer on religion, develops a distinctive interpretation of his subject.
But
the basic narrative is there in all three treatments. The descendant of
Italian immigrants to Argentina, devout from an early age and committed
to the priesthood after a teenage epiphany, Bergoglio entered the
Jesuit order in 1958, just four years before the Second Vatican Council
opened in Rome. His training was long (Jesuits spend more than a decade
“in formation”) and initially old-fashioned in its rigors; the order in
Argentina devoted a great deal of its work to educating the national
elite. But by the time he took his final vow and became a Jesuit in
full, in 1973, the reforms of the Council and the turbulence that
followed had dramatically changed his order, and divided it.
Many
of Bergoglio’s fellow Jesuits believed they had a postconciliar mandate
to make the pursuit of social justice the order’s organizing mission. In
Latin America, the emerging Big Idea for what this meant was liberation
theology, which promoted a synthesis between Gospel faith and
Marxist-flavored political activism. Argentina’s provincial, the head of
the country’s Jesuits, Ricardo O’Farrell, offered encouragement to
these ideas. He backed priests who essentially wanted to live as
political organizers among Argentina’s poor. He also supported a
syllabus rewrite that was “heavy on sociology and Hegelian dialectics,”
as Ivereigh describes it, and lighter on traditional Catholic elements.
But
O’Farrell soon found himself dealing with a crisis: the number of men
entering the order plummeted, and more-conservative Jesuits openly
revolted. In the summer of 1973, he stepped aside, and at just 36,
Bergoglio was elevated in his place. In many ways he made a success of
things. The order’s numbers rebounded, and he won many admirers among
the priests formed under his leadership. But he made enemies as well,
most of them on the order’s theological and political left. Radical
priests felt that their revolution had been betrayed, and a coterie of
Jesuit academics fretted that Bergoglio’s program for Jesuits in
training—which restored traditional elements abandoned by O’Farrell—was
too reactionary, too pre–Vatican II. Ivereigh quotes one critic
marveling that Bergoglio encouraged students to
go to the chapel at night and touch images! This was something the poor did, the people of the pueblo, something that the Society of Jesus worldwide just doesn’t do. I mean, touching images … What is that?
His
leadership also coincided with the 1976 military coup and the “Dirty
War,” during which left-wing Jesuits were particular targets for the
junta’s thugs. Bergoglio was accused of complicity in the arrest and
torture of two priests, a charge that Ivereigh and Piqué think is
baseless; Vallely hedges, but seems to mostly concur. Indeed, all three
biographers make clear that Bergoglio labored tirelessly behind the
scenes to save people (not only priests) in danger of joining the ranks
of the “disappeared.”
But
he did not attack the Dirty War publicly, and the Jesuits under his
leadership kept a low political profile as well. The entire Argentine
Church was a compromised force during the junta’s rule, and Bergoglio
probably couldn’t have played the kind of role that, say, the
soon-to-be-beatified archbishop Oscar Romero played in El Salvador. But
some in the order blamed his conservatism, as they saw it, for the
absence of a clear Jesuit witness against the junta’s crimes.
Eventually
these critics gained the upper hand. Not long after Bergoglio’s term
ended in 1979, his policies were altered or reversed. Just over a decade
later, following a period in which the Argentine Jesuits were divided
into pro- and anti-Bergoglio camps, he was exiled from the leadership,
sent to a Jesuit residence in the mountain town of Córdoba, and
essentially left to rot.
That
exile lasted almost two years, and ended when John Paul II’s choice for
the archbishop of Buenos Aires, Antonio Quarracino, reached out and
picked Bergoglio to serve as one of his auxiliaries in 1992. The rescue
made everything that followed possible, but it also completed the former
provincial’s break with his own order. Ivereigh notes that over the
next 20 years, during which he took many trips to the Vatican, Bergoglio
never so much as set foot in the Jesuit headquarters in Rome.
Told this way—conservative
Jesuit fights post–Vatican II radicalization, finds himself shunned by
left-wing confreres, gets rescued by a John Paul appointee—the story of
Francis’s rise and fall and rise sounds for all the world like The Making of a Conservative Pope.
And indeed, a number of Catholic writers greeted Bergoglio’s
election—some optimistically, some despairingly—with exactly that
interpretation of his past’s likely impact on his papacy. But it seems
fair to say that this interpretation was mistaken. So how, exactly, did
the man who fought bitterly with left-wing Jesuits in the 1970s become
the darling of progressive Catholics in the 2010s?
Piqué’s
biography doesn’t even attempt to explain this seeming paradox. She
blurs the tensions by treating Bergoglio’s 1970s-era critics
dismissively—without really digging into the theological and political
roots of the disputes—and then portraying Bergoglio the archbishop as
basically progressive in his orientation. After succeeding Quarracino,
she writes, he fought with “right-wing adversaries in the Roman Curia,”
publicly showed annoyance at “obsessive strictness” on sexual ethics,
and so on.
Vallely has a more creative argument. He suggests that
Francis was essentially a pre–Vatican II traditionalist as provincial,
and then, in exile, experienced a kind of theological and political
conversion to his critics’ point of view. This is a fascinating idea,
but perhaps too psychologically pat, and Vallely’s documentary evidence
is interesting but thin. He makes much, for instance, of the older
Bergoglio’s tendency to retrospectively criticize the too-hasty or
overly authoritarian decision making of his earlier years. But much of
this self-criticism seems more about style than about religious
substance. And Vallely (like his sources) is rather too fond of false
dichotomies: it’s supposed to be surprising, a sign of some radical
interior change, that a theological conservative could be pastoral or
want to spend time among the poor.
Bergoglio’s
thinking clearly evolved. But the more plausible explanation for what’s
going on emerges out of Ivereigh’s biography, which proposes a general
continuity between the young provincial of the 1970s and the pope of
today. To begin with, Ivereigh stresses that the younger Bergoglio was
never a real traditionalist, never an enemy of Vatican II, never a foe
of renewal or reform. Instead, he was trying to heed the warning of Yves
Congar, the great mid-century Catholic theologian, that “true reform”
must always be safeguarded from “false” alternatives. Bergoglio’s
battles with radicals and liberals in his own order shouldn’t be
interpreted as a case of the Catholic right resisting change. They
should be understood as an attempt to steer a moderate course, to
discern which changes are necessary and fruitful, and to reject the
errors of both extremes.
This perspective undergirds Ivereigh’s
larger argument that—the attention-grabbing “radical pope” language in
his subtitle notwithstanding—there’s actually a greater consistency of
views among Francis, Benedict, and John Paul than some press caricatures
would suggest. Both of Francis’s predecessors were also men of Vatican
II, liberals in the context of the Council’s debates who tried to rein
in radical interpretations of its reforms and emphasize the continuity
between the Church before and after. Like Francis, both were defenders
of popular Catholic piety and mysticism—what Benedict, as Cardinal
Ratzinger, called “the faith of the little ones”—against the
condescension of certain progressive theologians. And both, like him,
rejected fusions of Christianity and Marxism while offering at best a
cheer and a half for capitalism.
Yet
several crucial issues—some raised explicitly by Ivereigh, some
implicit in all three biographies—set Francis’s background and worldview
apart. They help explain why his pontificate looks much more friendly
to progressive strands within Catholicism than anyone expected from the
successor to the previous two popes.
First, Jorge Bergoglio had a
very different experience of globalization than Karol Wojtyła (who would
become Pope John Paul II) and Joseph Ratzinger did in Europe, one
shaped by disappointments particular to his country. For most of his
life, his native Argentina was an economic loser, persistently
underperforming and corruption-wracked. During the 1980s, inequality and
the poverty rate increased in tandem; in the late ’90s and early 2000s,
while Bergoglio was archbishop, Argentina endured a downturn and a
depression. Where his predecessors’ skepticism of capitalism and
consumerism was mainly intellectual and theoretical, for Bergoglio the
critique became something more visceral and personal.
Second, in
the course of his political experience in Argentina, he encountered very
different balances of power—between the left and the right, between
Church and state, and within global Catholicism—than either of the
previous two popes confronted. As much as Bergoglio clashed with
Marxist-influenced Jesuits, the Marxists in Argentina weren’t running
the state (as they were in John Paul’s Poland, and in the eastern bloc
of Benedict’s native Germany). They were being murdered by it. Likewise,
the fact that the Church in Argentina was compromised during the Dirty
War had theological implications: it meant that for Bergoglio,
more-intense forms of traditionalist Catholicism were associated with
fascism in a very specific, immediate way. And coming from the Church’s
geographical periphery himself, Bergoglio had reasons to sympathize with
the progressive argument that John Paul had centralized too much power
in the Vatican, and that local churches needed more freedom to evolve.
Third,
while highly intellectual in his own distinctive way, Francis is
clearly a less systematic thinker than either of his predecessors, and
especially than the academic-minded Benedict. Whereas the previous pope
defended popular piety against liberal critiques, Francis embodies a
certain style of populist Catholicism—one that’s suspicious of overly
academic faith in any form. He seems to have an affinity for the kind of
Catholic culture in which Mass attendance might be spotty but the local
saint’s processions are packed—a style of faith that’s fervent and
supernaturalist but not particularly doctrinal. He also remains a
Jesuit-formed leader, and Jesuits have traditionally combined missionary
zeal with a certain conscious flexibility about doctrinal details that
might impede their proselytizing work. This has often made them
controversial among other missionary orders, as in the famous debate
over the efforts of Matteo Ricci. A Jesuit in China during the late 16th
and early 17th centuries, Ricci was attacked for incorporating Chinese
concepts into his preaching and permitting converts to continue to
venerate their ancestors. That Ricci is currently on the path to
canonization, and his critics are mostly forgotten, says something
important about the value of Jesuit envelope-pushing within the Church.
But it also says something important that Catholicism has never before
had a Jesuit pope.
Finally,
Francis has a different base of support—and thus a different set of
debts to pay, perhaps—within the Catholic hierarchy than the popes who
preceded him had. He became a papal candidate at the 2005 conclave, and
was elected pope eight years later, thanks to efforts made on his behalf
by a small group of European cardinals, including Godfried Danneels of
Belgium, Walter Kasper of Germany, England’s Cormac Murphy-O’Connor, and
the late Carlo Maria Martini, himself a Jesuit and the former
archbishop of Milan. In the John Paul era, all four men were among the
most theologically liberal cardinals; Martini was regarded wistfully as a
kind of might-have-been progressive pope.
Both
Ivereigh (a former adviser to Murphy-O’Connor) and Vallely leave little
doubt as to this group’s importance. What is in doubt is how Bergoglio,
who reportedly urged his supporters to vote for Ratzinger in 2005
rather than prolong the vote, felt about their efforts in either
conclave, and how he feels about them now. Clearly the liberal cardinals
fastened onto him as a candidate because they saw him as theologically
closer to the center of the conclave and more doctrinally reliable than
any of their group; clearly his support within the 2013 conclave
extended well beyond just the liberal faction. At the same time, it is
striking that the men who arguably did the most to make Bergoglio
pontiff were among the cardinals most in opposition to the previous two
popes. These distinctive features of
his background have helped define Francis’s agenda for the Church. The
areas where he has the strongest mandate lie in governance: reforming
the Vatican bureaucracy, purging corruption from the Curia, and
reorienting the Church’s leadership toward the global South. These
projects are natural extensions of his past experience, as are their
rhetorical accompaniments—the public scoldings of worldly and careerist
clergy, and the vision of a Church in which the “peripheries” (Africa,
Latin America, Asia) bring renewal to the center.
So
too with what looks like the broadest theme of his pontificate: his
constant stress on economic issues, the Church’s social teachings, and
the plight of the unemployed, the immigrant, the poor. The content here
may not be different from previous papal statements on these subjects,
but Francis returns to these issues much more often. His sharp,
prophetic tone—the recurring references to the “throwaway culture” of
modern capitalism, the condemnation of “an economy [that] kills”—seems
intended to grab attention, to spotlight these issues, and to shatter
the press’s image of a Church exclusively interested in sexual morality.
In
this sense and others, Francis may indeed see his papacy as a kind of
moderate corrective to the previous two. Rather than conceiving of
himself primarily as a custodian of Catholic truth against relativizing
trends, he seems to be trying to occupy a carefully balanced center
between two equally dangerous poles. At one extreme are “the
‘do-gooders’ ” and “the so-called ‘progressives and liberals,’ ” as he
put it in his closing remarks to last fall’s synod on the family. At the
other extreme, to be equally condemned, are “the zealous” and “the
scrupulous” and “the so-called—today—‘traditionalists.’ ”
To
further that balancing act, his appointments, while hardly uniform, have
filled the higher ranks of bishops and cardinals not only with more
non-Europeans but with more men from the Church’s progressive wing. (The
most prominent example is Blase J. Cupich, the new archbishop of
Chicago, who was plucked from a minor diocese to run one of America’s
most important sees.) Meanwhile Francis has shown explicit disfavor, not
so much toward mainstream-conservative clerics, but toward those
explicitly associated with traditionalism and the Latin Mass. Cardinal
Raymond L. Burke, a Benedict appointee demoted to a mostly ceremonial
position, is the famous case, but traditionalist-leaning bishops and
religious orders have felt a chill wind at times as well.
Amid
these moves, conservative Catholics have consoled themselves by noting
that Francis is not at all like the left-wing Jesuits he feuded with in
the 1970s. As he certainly is not: His economic vision offers a general
critique of greed and indifference, rather than a specific
social-democratic program, and there is nothing secularized about his
style. He is devotional in his piety, supernatural and sometimes
apocalyptic in his themes (complete with frequent mentions of the
devil), and emphatic about the importance of the sacraments and saints.
And he has stated clearly that he has neither the intention nor the
capacity to alter the Church’s teachings on such issues as abortion and
same-sex marriage.
All of this makes it imaginable that Francis
could succeed in his balancing act. So long as doctrine doesn’t seem to
be in question, a papal agenda focused on ending corruption in the
Vatican and emphasizing a commitment to the global poor could
successfully straddle some of the Church’s internal divides—not least
because those divides aren’t always as binary as the language of “left
and right” suggests. Many theological conservatives in the developing
world are natural economic populists, and they’re perfectly happy with
the way this pope talks about globalization and the free market. The
allergy to some of his rhetoric is mostly confined to the American
right, and even there it’s largely an elite-level phenomenon; Francis’s
approval rating in the United States among conservative Catholics is
about as high—that is, very high—as it is among Catholics who identify
as moderate or liberal. And at least some in the latter groups mostly
want the Church to de-emphasize the culture war rather than change
specific teachings, so Francis’s rhetorical shifts may be enough to
satisfy them.
But
there are times when Francis himself seems to desire something more
than just a change in emphasis. Even as he has officially reaffirmed
Church teachings on sex and marriage, he has shown a persistent
impatience—populist, Jesuit, or both—with the obstacles these teachings
present to bringing some lapsed Catholics back to the Church. His
frustration has emerged most clearly on the issue of divorce and
remarriage: he has repeatedly shown what seems to be tacit support for
the idea, long endorsed by Walter Kasper and other liberal cardinals, to
allow Catholics in a second marriage to receive Communion even if their
first marriage is still considered valid—that is, even if they are
living in what the Church considers an adulterous relationship.
The
argument, from Kasper and others, is that this would be strictly a
pastoral change, a gesture of welcome and forgiveness rather than an
endorsement of the second union, and so it wouldn’t alter the Church’s
formal teaching on the indissolubility of marriage. The possible
implication is that the post-sexual-revolution landscape is now as
culturally foreign to the Church as China was in the age of Matteo
Ricci, and that some cultural accommodation is needed before missionary
work can thrive.
The problem for Francis is that Kasper’s argument
is not particularly persuasive. Describing Communion for the remarried
as merely a pastoral change ignores its inevitable doctrinal
implications. If people who are living as adulterers can receive
Communion, if the Church can recognize their state of life as nonideal
but somehow tolerable, then either the Church’s sacramental theology or
its definition of sin has been effectively rewritten. And the
ramifications of such a change are potentially sweeping. If ongoing
adultery is forgivable, then why not other forms of loving,
long-standing sexual commitment? Not only same-sex couples but
cohabiting straight couples and even polygamous families (a particular
concern among African cardinals) could make a plausible case that they
deserve the same pastoral exception, rendering the very idea of
objective sexual sin anachronistic in one swift march.
This,
then, is the place where Francis’s quest for balance could, through his
own initiative, ultimately fall apart, bringing the very culture war
he’s downplayed back to center stage. And it’s the place where his
pontificate could become genuinely revolutionary. His other moves are
changing the Church, but in gradual and reversible ways, leaving lines
of conflict blurry and tensions bridgeable. But altering a teaching on
sex and marriage that the Church has spent centuries insisting it simply
cannot alter—a teaching on a question addressed directly (as, say,
homosexuality is not) by Jesus himself—is a very different thing. It
would suggest to the world, and to many Catholics, that Catholicism was
formally capitulating to the sexual revolution. It would grant the
Church’s progressives reasonable grounds for demanding room for further
experiments. And it would make it impossible for many conservatives, lay
and clerical, to avoid some kind of public opposition to the pope.
Such
a development probably would not produce an immediate crisis or schism.
But it would put the Church on the kind of trajectory that the Anglican
Communion and other Protestant denominations have traced on these
issues, and would make some eventual division much more likely. As
pastoral experiments proliferated, geographical and cultural differences
would matter more and more, and official Catholic teaching would
effectively vary from country to country, diocese to diocese, in a more
explicit way than it does today. (Already, the German bishops are
telegraphing their intention to move ahead with a Kasper-like approach
no matter what happens in Rome.) Open clashes within the hierarchy would
become commonplace. Criticisms of the pope would become normal among
the self-consciously orthodox, and the stakes would get higher with
every subsequent papal election and intervention.
None of this would be exactly new: Catholic
Christianity has never been monolithic, and similar divisions have
opened up across the past 2,000 years. But those examples are not
particularly encouraging, given that many major theological disputes
have led, as you would expect, to major schisms, from the early splits
with the Copts and Monophysites and Nestorians, to the separation from
the Eastern Church, to the late-medieval Great Schism, and of course to
the Protestant Reformation.
Perhaps the debates of the sexual
revolution will look less significant in hindsight than controversies
over the nature of Christ’s divinity or Reformation-era arguments about
papal authority and the sacraments. But from the beginning, sexual
ethics have been closer to the heart of Christianity and Christian life
than many theological progressives now assume. Not for nothing did
Philip Rieff describe ideals like monogamy and chastity as part of “the
consensual matrix of Christian culture.” It’s not really surprising that
in Protestant churches, these debates have often threatened or produced
schism.
Which raises an important question: Is this what liberal Catholics want? The answer,
in my experience, is no. Most liberal Catholics would simply dismiss
the argument I’ve just made. Some don’t see any reason the Church can’t
enact one or two changes on sexual ethics while holding the line on
other fronts; they think conservatives are exaggerating the extent to
which the Church’s view of human sexuality is, like Jesus’s robe, a
seamless garment. Others sincerely think that a shift like the one
Cardinal Kasper is proposing really does amount to merely a pastoral
tweak (like the post–Vatican II disappearance of meatless Fridays), and
conservatives will grumble and then quickly learn to live with it.
More
broadly, there’s an assumption that a distinction between practice and
doctrine is sustainable, or at least sustainable over the decades or
centuries required for conservative opposition to diminish. Indeed, many
liberal Catholics would say that’s how the Church always changes. A
teaching or an idea (the prohibition against usury, say, or the
theological speculation that unbaptized infants who die go to Limbo)
gradually becomes vestigial: Catholics ignore it and churchmen stop
talking about it, and then eventually the hierarchy comes up with some
official-sounding explanation (one that starts, “As the Church has always
taught …”) for why it’s no longer really in force. The rest of Catholic
teaching holds together just fine during this transition; there’s no
danger of a Jenga effect, no thread-pulling that ends up unraveling the
whole.
This view is widespread without always being made explicit. Sometimes it gets a full airing, though: in his new book, The Future of the Catholic Church With Pope Francis
(in which the pontiff himself appears mostly in extremely selective
quotation), the longtime papal critic Garry Wills offers a vision of the
Catholic future in which the Church’s understanding of natural law, its
opposition to abortion, and even the sacrament of confession are all
destined for the same fate as the Latin Mass. (Wills already dispensed
with the priesthood itself in Why Priests? A Failed Tradition, so disposing of a sacrament is relatively easy work.)
His
view of Catholic history is ruthlessly consistent. The “development of
dogma” really just means that doctrines come and go at history’s whim,
and no idea or institution—save some kind of belief in Jesus’s divinity,
presumably—is necessarily essential. Instead there’s just one damn
thing after another, and if the Church teaches one thing in one age,
reversing itself in the next is no big deal. Here his book boldly
repurposes the views of G. K. Chesterton, who pointed out how
impressively the Church shook itself free of the failing Roman empire,
the dying medieval world, and eventually the ancien régime. To
Chesterton, this proved the faith’s resilience and ultimately its
capital‑T Truth. To Wills, it proves that the Church can just change the faith as it sees fit to suit a changing world.
Wills
is an outlier among liberal Catholics, most of whom tend to be more
modest and gradualist, and less inclined to take premises to their
extreme. But most progressives share his basic conviction that
conservative resistance on just about any doctrinal issue can eventually
be overcome, and that Catholicism will always somehow remain
Catholicism no matter how many once-essential-seeming things are altered
or abandoned. In the age of Francis,
this progressive faith seems to rest on two assumptions. The first is
that the changes conservatives are resisting are, in fact, necessary for
missionary work in the post-sexual-revolution age, and that once
they’re accomplished, the subsequent renewal will justify the means. The
second is that because conservative Catholics are so invested in papal
authority, a revolution from above can carry all before it: the
conservatives’ very theology makes it impossible for them to effectively
resist a liberalizing pope, and anyway they have no other place to go.
But
the first assumption now has a certain amount of evidence against it,
given how many of the Protestant churches that have already liberalized
on sexual issues—again, often dividing in the process—are presently
aging toward a comfortable extinction. (As is, of course, the Catholic
Church in Germany, ground zero for Walter Kasper’s vision of reform.)
Contemporary
progressive Catholicism has been stamped by the experience of the
Second Vatican Council, when what was then a vital American Catholicism
could be invoked as evidence that the Church should make its peace with
liberalism as it was understood in 1960. But liberalism in 2015 means
something rather different, and attempts to accommodate Christianity to
its tenets have rarely produced the expected flourishing and growth.
Instead, liberal Christianity’s recent victories have very often been
associated with the decline or dissolution of its institutional
expressions.
Which leaves the second assumption for liberals to
fall back on—a kind of progressive ultramontanism, which assumes that
papal power can remake the Church without dividing it, and that when
Rome speaks, even disappointed conservatives will ultimately concede
that the case is closed.
It is a brave theory. We will soon find out whether Papa Francesco intends to put it to the test.
What should ordinary Catholics do about the controversy over the
“filial correction” of Pope Francis, put forth by more than 60
theologians and clergy — and counting?
For the great majority of the billion-strong faithful who do not
follow Vatican affairs closely, the 25-page “Correctio filialis de
haeresibus propagates,” by its full Latin title, respectfully asked Pope
Francis to disavow certain statements, actions and omissions that, in
the signatories’ view, propagate heresy.
To recap our layman’s paraphrase of the heresies violating
centuries-old Church doctrines affirmed by past popes, the incumbent
Supreme Pontiff is alleged to have spread by word, deed and omission the
following heretical views:
1) There are commands of God that people cannot obey even with His grace.
2) A
divorced Christian, whose Church marriage is not annulled or ended by
the spouse’s death, does not commit mortal sin even if the Christian and
another partner live as husband and wife.
3) A believer can commit a grave violation of divine law knowingly and willfully, yet not have mortal sin.
4) A person following God’s commandment can sin against Him.
5) A person’s conscience can rightly determine that sexual relations
with someone other than one’s spouse in a valid Church marriage, could
be a morally righteous act or even a request or command from God.
6) In moral truths and laws contained in divine revelation, there are no absolute prohibitions of certain acts.
7) Our Lord Jesus Christ wants the Church to set aside its
millennia-old rules of denying communion at mass and absolution in
confession to divorced Catholics who live with new partners as husband
and wife, without their Church marriages being annulled. Can the Pope be corrected?
Many Catholics may wonder whether the Pope can be wrong and subject to
correction. After all, he is supposed to be infallible, protected from
error by the Holy Spirit Himself.
Well, infallibility, in fact, applies narrowly to tenets of faith
declared in a special ex cathedra process, which Francis has never
invoked. Moreover, the Correctio rightly points out, the Holy Father’s
paramount duty is to safeguard the precious store of doctrines passed on
through the centuries, not revise them.
If he takes positions adverse to established beliefs, he may be
corrected or even automatically excommunicated, depending on the dogma
violated. For instance, if he were to deny the divinity of Jesus Christ,
he ceases to be a Catholic and can no longer continue as head of the
Church.
Okay, so the Pope can make mistakes. Now, should lowly believers
unschooled in the profound complexities of theology actually take sides
in doctrinal disputes, which few laymen can understand? Shouldn’t the
faithful just let the hierarchy and the clergy sort out the dogmatic
jousts, then accept the victor?
To fence-sitters waiting for the doctrinal dust to clear, it may be
good to recall the warnings of Servant of God and Fatima visionary Lucia
dos Santos, spoken half a century ago:
“She [Mary] told me that the devil is about to wage a decisive battle
against the Blessed Virgin, … where one side will be victorious and the
other side will suffer defeat. Also, from now on, we must choose sides.
Either we are for God or we are for the devil; there is no in-between.“
Sister Lucia further expounded in a 2003 letter Cardinal Carlo
Cafarra, then head of a new institute on the family: “The final battle
between the Lord and the reign of Satan will be about marriage and the
family. Don’t be afraid, because anyone who works for the sanctity of
marriage and the family, will always be fought and opposed in every way,
because this is a decisive issue. However, Our Lady has already crushed
its head.”
And really, making little effort to at least know something about
doctrinal matters hardly shows great value for precious Catholic beliefs
and practices, for which so many have not only suffered privation and
persecution, but even offered their very lives.
No such sacrifice is demanded of anyone at this time. What is urged
is awareness of the issues, which impinge on fundamental moral tenets. Yes or no, Your Holiness
What is clear from the past year of controversy is that the Holy Father
has declined to respond directly to requests for clarification on the
doctrinal issues of morals and family. Indeed, he declined to answer
even four leading cardinals, including Cafarra, who asked yes or no
questions or “dubia” whether certain longstanding tenets of the Church
still hold.
The cardinals asked in their letter made public last year if acts
deemed sinful by the Church could be rendered right by personal
discernment, and if communion and absolution could be given to those who
continue in relationships forbidden by the Church, among other matters
seeking clarity.
What then emerges is a situation when established doctrines and
practices are changing with papal acquiescence or exhortation, but no
explicit Vatican declaration.
Most believers would probably just go along with that, and many will
be happy with it, since it may allow once-proscribed acts and
lifestyles.
In this emerging new moral landscape, what does the conservative Catholic keen to keep age-old mores do?
Well, go ahead and keep them. That narrow path will be more
challenging than the widening road opened by more liberal norms coming
out of the Vatican. But that millennia-old route will, as it has done
for millennia, lead the obedient souls to heaven. Amen.
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